Much has been written of the failure of COP 15 in Copenhagen. Still, there is surprisingly little clarity – or consistency – in the press regarding what actually happened and why.
The implications of what happened are profoundly important, but not – in the short term at least – for climate change nearly as much as for geopolitics. At Copenhagen, all the global powers (and powerless) we’re thrown into a room together and told, “go get what you want, but please play nice”. If this “experiment” was run with children, the result couldn’t have been much different.
We witnessed a spectrum of behaviors and negotiating strategies – from coalition-building to bullying – with a wide range of results. Copenhagen’s significance is that it was the coming-out party for the new, multipolar “cold-tug-of-war”, which is anchored by China and the U.S. but occasionally wobbles when Russia roars, that has been emerging beneath the geopolitical surface for the last 10 years. This dynamic, which was laid bare under the bright lights in Copenhagen for all to see for the first time, will characterize much of the 21st century.
In summary, several things occured at Copenhagen:
- The EU was disillusioned that the world shared its key beliefs in a) collective action with a willingness to pool sovereignty, and b) commitment to addressing climate change.
- The US and Obama revealed a deep insecurity about its power, and it negotiated poorly
- China negotiated cleverly, but behaved poorly, revealing an internal calculus that eschews credibility to bolster power. As a result, the EU, US and other international powers could no longer pretend that China can be trusted to respect international norms or agreements.
The U.S. and EU were dramatically outmaneuvered by China. Europe, in seeing much of the world as a reflection of itself where states negotiate to maximize their benefit but are nonetheless willing to pool their energies for a greater goal, had its faith shattered. It was shell-shocked; the EU had not believed that major parties such as China would actually rather sabotage the process and take advantage of other participants efforts to compromise for their own gain, than to work for the best possible negotiated settlement. This was never a possibility in their deliberations – tough negotiators, yes, but not saboteurs. And the Americans, who begrudgingly came to Copenhagen to ensure their entry into climate change agreements would be slow and dignified, came with a weak negotiating position that afforded few tactical options, which they misplayed.
The shock comes from misguided expectations. In the weeks and months leading up to COP15, the U.S. was widely assumed to be the most likely cause for any failure at Copenhagen. A hotly partisan U.S. domestic political situation was already locked in battle over costly financial bailouts and healthcare reform. Congressional leaders have long feared climate change legislation for the clear and quantifiable costs it would impose on utility ratepayers, who also happen to be their electorate, in return for the uncertain, diffuse and intergenerational benefits it may or may not return. In addition to the climate change doubters and sundry special interest lobbies that inevitably confuse the debate, strong opposition centered around concerns that climate change legislation would undermine American industrial competitiveness, sending dollars and jobs to developing countries unburdened by the stringent CO2 reductions being demanded. The expectation that the US would also contribute to significant financial payments to those same emerging economies further salted the wounds.
For this reason, it was a clear that the U.S. would never pass legislation, let alone sign up to international commitments, without certaintly that the large emerging economies and specifically China were also committed to significant constraints in accordance with the agreed standard of “common but differentiated action based on national circumstances”.
Unfortunately, this was obvious to China as well.
Nevertheless, during the high-level negotiations when disturbing signals from China became clearer and clearer, first with diplomatic snubs and then with China methodically striking every objectional item from the agreement, the U.S. failed to play its strongest defense: walking away. The U.S. could have made it credible and managed the delicate publicity by demanding the Chinese demonstrate serious intentions and good faith (such as by sending Hu Jintao to the heads of state meeting). It would have been a high stakes move, but China forced their hand. Unfortunately, the U.S. failed to demand proper participation by China, undermining their own negotiating power and positioning themselves to be taken advantage of.
In its zeal to grab for the win, China failed to even feign like it was trying to play according the the norms of high-level negotiations. Like a young child grabbing for the cookies even after promising it wouldn’t, China showed the entire international community gathered around the room – literally- that it could not be trusted to act in good faith or collective interests. China is already well-known to schizophrenically demand at times to be treated like a mature power and others like the young poor nation in need of resources and support. Showing that it cannot be trusted even when the world’s Ministers and Heads of State are negotiating with it means nations will no longer take China at its word in hope for future benefits. Interests will need to be protected with clear disincentives in negotiations from now on. As a result, China has provided nations the basis they need to deny China one thing it craves: respect.
One explanation for this is despite China’s long-term view of its own interests, it has achieved great success by highly discounting reputational value (ie. future benefits from current compromises, in repeated-game theory parlance) for the very real benefits extracted today from external parties (countries and companies). This translates into a well-known lack of respect for intellectual property rights. While I’m no China analyst, often cited sources for this behavior are Chinese insecurities from (and sense of entitlement because of) their colonial past, and pragmatic calculations about internal demographics and the speed of development required to catch up to the world, which can be summarized in terms of greater long-run gains through sheer economic and physical might.
Some commentators have said the biggest failure at Copenhagen was China’s failure to pin the blame squarely on the U.S., which it was in an excellent position to do had it not acted so openly to scuttle the accords.
The reason China busted the Accord is astoundingly simple. China’s strength comes from two sources – cheap labor (demographics) and cheap, dirty coal. In the evening of Friday 18 December, as the talks were winding down, in addition to the 2°C limit on climate change nations had tentatively agreed to a global 50% reduction in emissions, which is based on the widely agreed upon target of 80-95% reduction for industrial countries and continued growth in emerging markets. The Copenhagen Accord would also record in Appendix I industrialized countries’ unilateral, already-announced “Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020”, such as the U.S. 17% reduction. Yet by Saturday morning when the Accord was released, China had managed, through exasperating negotiations (detailed here by Mark Lynas of the UK Guardian) to remove any reference to the 50% target OR countries own plans! Why? Because the next logical step after the industrials countries commit to a target is for the largest emitters – China – to limit theirs. China’s economy grows at roughly 7-10% p.a., which means it doubles every 8-10 years. Buying themselves 3-5 years while the world regroups and signs up to an agreement is immensely valuable to China.
The near-absence of press about the Accords since COP15 ended illustrates how profoundly disappointing Copenhagen was. However, unlike Mark Lynas of the Guardian and so many others, I’m neither convinced that climate doom nor China’s 21st centrury dominance were sealed in Copenhagen.
As far as the climate goes, for the first time all leading industrialized countries were willing to commit to carbon reductions. They have already agreed to $100 billion in long term funding flows and pledged $30 billion of fast-start financing. They have also agreed in principle to all major stumbling blocks with developing countries, and tracks have been established to work out the details of several key focal areas, such as forestry and agriculture, where progress should be easier when only the most relevant parties are involved. And climate change policy has become a cornerstone of economic development policy at the highest levels in countries such as Germany, the U.S. and U.K.
As for China’s role, the world had a wake up call. As a result, nations are no longer unwilling to confront the Asian dragon as it is clear appeasement earns nothing. This is already evident in the U.S. rhetoric and politics, for example having just authorized stalled sales of weap0ns to Taiwan. China has undermined its own quest for trust and credibility based on its calculation that a few years of unfetterd growth are adequate compensation. They could be right, but governments across the globe are reevaluating their approach to China.
As countries also search for ways to recover from the economic slowdown, climate change is being reincarnated in green growth policies and targeted areas for job creation. So, while Copenhagen was a disorganized mess and the Accord a joke, I still believe it represented a critical step in advancing climate change and low carbon growth as an irreversible fact of life, and Copenhagen will be regarded as a seminal moment in 21st century geopolitics.